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Since the rise of the behavioralist revolution in the 1950s and 1960s the political science
discipline has struggled to find agreement on a uniform vision of the study of politics,
particularly as it relates to the employment of methods. This article addresses behavioralism’s
influence on the decline of public law analysis in the field of presidential studies. Specifically, it
focuses on the work of presidential scholars Edward Corwin and Richard Neustadt in high-
lighting the changes to the study of the presidency. Attention is also paid to the decline of
normative types of public law analysis. The article concludes with a call for greater acceptance,
and practice, of public law analysis.
Since the founding of the political science discipline in the early twentieth century
there has routinely been calls for change. One of the latest examples occurred at the dawn
of the twentieth-first century when an anonymous scholar sent the “Perestroika” e-mail to
the editors of the American Political Science Review asking for a number of reforms to the
American Political Science Association (APSA). Among them were a call for greater
diversity of membership on the APSA governing committees and its journals along with
a need for the discipline to become more accepting of a greater number of methodologies
(PS 2000).
The Perestroika movement largely touched on old discipline identity struggles. For
example, the postbehavioral era emerged in the mid to late 1960s as some of the leading
behavioralists began to question their own way of studying political science. The 1969
APSA presidential address by David Easton directly confronted the behavioral orthodoxy:
“Only on the assumption that behavioral political science has said the last word about
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what makes for adequate research and an appropriate discipline can we automatically read
out of court any proposals for change” (Easton 1969a, 1053). In particular, Easton took
on the inability of behavioralism to predict some of the great changes that had occurred
through the 1960s and he pleaded for “more relevant research” that will “improve
political life” (Easton 1969a, 1053).
Appearing in between those two “movements” Gabriel Almond, a well-known
behavioral scholar, published the classic article “Separate Tables” in which he noted that
there was an “uneasiness in the political science profession” (1988, 829). He suggested
that political scientists might be eating in the same dining room but were now at
different tables with the most significant separation between the “hard” (quantitative)
and “soft” (descriptive) scholars (Almond 1988, 829). Almond explained that the “mood
and reputation” of the political science discipline was “heavily influenced by these
extreme views” (1988, 830).
One of the results of the behavioralist revolution that has received little attention
is the decline in public law analysis within political science. As far back as the 1920s—a
period when Charles Merriam delivered his APSA presidential address titled, “Progress
in Political Research”—there have been calls to move away from public law analysis
(Merriam 1926). Although the term “public law” is not as well known today, in its more
traditional form it is a mode of inquiry that analyzes the Constitution and laws so as to
better understand the institutional operations of government and/or the behavior of
elected and unelected officials. It involves the study of not only constitutional and
statutory text along with judicial opinions, but also the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of government. In the area of presidential studies, the work of
Edward Corwin (1929, 1932, 1957) best represents this form of analysis.
The main objective of this article is to highlight the importance of public law
analysis in the presidential studies field. First, a brief summary of the behavioralist
movement and its weaknesses is presented. Next, the article addresses the impact
behavioralism has had on presidential studies by focusing on the work of presidential
scholars Edward Corwin (1929, 1932, 1957) and Richard Neustadt (1960, 1990). An
emphasis is placed on the decline of normative types of public law analysis. The article
concludes with a call for greater encouragement and acceptance of public law analysis.
Behavioralism and Political Science
Before addressing the impact of behavioralism on presidency studies, it is useful to
briefly describe the movement. First, behavioralists contend that political science scholars
should focus on the behavior of individuals, groups, and systems in order to explain how
politics operates in practice. They reject—or at least greatly downplay—the so-called
traditional understandings of studying politics that focus on theory (e.g., Plato, Aristotle,
and other political philosophers) or the formal operations of government by way of
constitutional or legal analysis (Farr 1995, 202). Instead, behavioralists argue that
political scientists should concern themselves with “what is, not with what ought to be”
(Dahl 1961, 770).
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The second key element of behavioralism is the emphasis on methods intended to
improve the accuracy of studying political behavior.Within the presidency field, the focus
on case studies became early on a dominant method of analysis (Neustadt 1960). As
behavioralismmatured, it placedgreater emphasis on thequantificationof studyingpolitics
(Farr 1995, 203). As quantification took hold, more political scientists took their methods
from economists and began to employ formal modeling using such frameworks as rational
choice—a theory that assumes individuals make choices that maximize their personal
interests. William Howell’s Power without Persuasion (2003) represents well the formal
modeling school that is increasingly seen in presidential studies. In his book,Howell claims
“a science of politics is finally taking hold of presidential studies” (Howell 2003, 11).
Finally, behavioralists—at least the early adherents of the movement (e.g., David
Easton, Robert Dahl, and David Truman) believed political science could reveal general
theories of politics akin to what are known in the natural sciences (e.g., Newton’s theory
of gravitation or Einstein’s theory of relativity) (Ricci 1984, 149). As David Easton once
quipped, “The lack of more reliable knowledge flows directly from an immoderate
neglect of general theory” (Easton 1969b, 31). All three of these elements point to a
movement that thought political science could be remade into the image of the natural
sciences (Bond 2007; Kirn 1977, 85; Leonard 1995, 84; Miller 1972, 802; Ricci 1984,
253;). Charles Merriam perhaps most effectively articulated the behavioralist desire to
incorporate the methods of the natural sciences into the study of politics: “more and more
it appears that the last word in human behavior is to be scientific; more and more clearly
it becomes evident that the social and political implications of natural science are of
fundamental importance” (1926, 9).
The dominance of behavioralism in political science is nearly unquestioned. By
1963, behavioralist scholars could point to their field of study being ranked at the top
within political science (Somit and Tanenhaus 1963, 941). Just two years prior, Robert
Dahl penned the victory celebration piece for behavioralism by noting that “the study of
politics has been altered, permanently, by a fresh infusion of the spirit of empirical
inquiry—by, that is to say, the scientific outlook” (1961, 772). Even today it can be
written that “behavioralism is still a powerful presence” in many areas of political science
(Hauptmann 2012, 154).
Of course, there are limits to the blending of science and politics. Political scientists
study institutions and people, not plants and animals. The former can, and do, read our
work; the latter do not. Presidents and other political actors can react to the knowledge
that they gain, which, in turn, affects the future study of the very people and institutions
political scientists research and analyze (Oren 2006, 79). In the field of presidential
studies, the best example of such behavior is when presidential candidate Jimmy Carter
in 1976 spoke about how much James David Barber’s book Presidential Character had
“heavily influenced” him and proclaimed himself to be an “an active positive” leader
(Barber 1992, 399). Carter was so influenced by the book that he had Barber and his wife
visit the governor’s mansion (Glad 1980, 487). Considering how central personality was
to his 1976 campaign, one cannot help but wonder what impact Barber’s study had on
Carter’s behavior (Glad 1980, 488). As Barber notes, his book may have merely “shaped
Carter’s presentation of himself,” and Barber “might have been charmed out of
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objectivity by the élan and ease of the Carter hospitality” (1992, 399). Barber quickly
dismisses such concerns, but the points raised are important ones to consider in the study
of human behavior.
Turning to behavioralism’s theoretical and methodological impulses, there has
always been an allure of discovering grand theories that will explain political behavior.
This is not a new endeavor. In 1929, Edward Corwin stated that behavioralists believed
political science could “predict the future just as astronomy, physics, and chemistry are
able to do—not to mention astrology, alchemy, and palmistry” (569579). By the mid-
1970s some observers noted that political scientists were no closer to finding “a coherent
and persuasive alternative vision of the meaning and practice of political science” that
behavioralists promised (Reid and Yanarella 1975, 288). By 2004, Robert Dahl had all
but abandoned any hope of creating “a general theory of politics” and suggested it “may
be a waste of scholarly time” (379). Others have found similar failings of the behavioralist
promise of discovering general theories (Farr 1995, 220-21; Miller 1990, 235-37;
Wahlke 1978, 24). But the pursuit of general theories is not dead. In 2012, Kim Quaile
Hill remarked, there is “a universally recognized assumption that theory building is a
primary goal of our discipline” (917).
Behavioralism’s drive to treat political science more like the natural sciences led
some in the discipline to employ formal modeling. William Howell explains that within
presidential studies “empirical tests now are commonplace; theoretical assumptions are
clearly specified; and hypotheses are subject to independent corroboration” (2003, 11).
Scholars who adopt modeling believe that the precision of one’s conclusions can be honed
through mathematical methods. The downside to such pursuits is that often formal
modelers are too focused on methods and not actual political problems (Green and
Shapiro 1994, 1996). One scholar even advocated that in order to advance modeling,
political scientists “should ignore the real world, or at least much of the information it
presents to us, more often than we do” (Hill 2012, 927). Modelers likely disagree that
they ignore political issues. However, Gabriel Almond criticized rational choice schol-
arship for too often introducing “supporting assumptions that are outside the logic of
objective rationality,” along with failing “to acknowledge assumptions that are important
for their policy conclusions, which may be of doubtful validity” (1990, 133-34).
Ian Shapiro has emphasized the need for political scientists to move past the
“theory-drivenness” of the discipline and instead work on smaller analytical problems.
Shaprio calls his approach “a two-step venture that starts when one shows that the
accepted way of characterizing a piece of political reality fails to capture an important
feature of what stands in need of explanation or justification. One then offers a
recharacterization that speaks to the inadequacies in the prior account” (2004, 39).
One could argue that many traditional and even behavioral minded political
scientists have been utilizing a “two-step” approach for decades. Yet Shapiro’s larger
point that political scientists need “to throw their weight against the powerful forces that
entice scholars to embroider fashionable theories and massage methods in which they are
professionally invested while failing to illuminate the world of politics” is a good one
(2004, 39-40). Although somewhat overstated, one cannot help but have some sympathy
for the conclusion that “political science has little to show for its century-long effort to
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follow the path of the natural sciences” (Oren 2006, 77). Perhaps in following the natural
sciences political science has focused too much on precision of its methods while paying
too little attention to the need for relevance and usefulness.
Behavioralism and Presidential Studies: Corwin and Neustadt
Focusing on behavioralism’s impact on presidential studies, the work of one of the
most prominent presidential scholars, Richard Neustadt, is illuminating. In 1960, as a
former Truman administration official, he suggested that the office of the chief executive
is essentially divorced from the Constitution and that presidential power amounts to “the
power to persuade” (Neustadt 1960, 10). He believed the presidency’s central focus is
with the accumulation and retention of power, arguing that when the presidency prevails
so does the nation: “What is good for the country is good for the President, and vice
versa” (Neustadt 1960, 185).
The significance of Neustadt’s work cannot be overstated. Thomas Cronin, writing
nearly two decades after the publication of Presidential Power, noted that the book was
received “as a brilliant and pioneering contribution to our understanding of the opera-
tional realities of presidential leadership” (Cronin 1979, 381). Raymond Tatalovich and
Steven Schier in their book on the history of presidential studies note that nearly “every
work of scholarship on the presidency pays homage to [Neustadt’s] seminal view of
presidential power as ‘influence’ or persuasion” (2014, 111). They also explain that
Neustadt’s work was in line with “the unfolding behavioral revolution,” which “itself
[was] a broadside attack on the historical, legalistic, and institutional framework of
scholars like [Edward] Corwin” (Tatalovich and Schier 2014, 112). Or as Michael Nelson
put it, “Neustadt’s Presidential Power wasn’t Corwin’s The President: Office and Powers, with
its old-style concern for law and Constitution” (1987, xiv).
In publishing Presidential Power, Neustadt reoriented the presidential field to the
model of presidents being power maximizers while paying little attention to the consti-
tutional or legal aspects of the office. From nearly the moment Neustadt’s work appeared,
there were criticisms of it that continue to this day (Dickinson 2009; Hargrove 2001). A
recent article by Benjamin Kleinerman (2014) objects that Neustadt’s presidential power
model at the very least provides an incomplete picture. Indeed, presidential power is often
not about persuasion but unilateral action in the form of vetoes and pardons that are powers
firmly rooted in the Constitution (Crouch 2009). But, according toWilliamHowell, under
the Neustadt model, “a reliance on formal powers actually signals weakness” (2003, 9).
More important than the incompleteness of Neustadt’s model is the larger issue of
behavioralism that his work represents—that is, a movement away from the study of the
Constitution and law in presidential studies (Nelson 1987, xvi). By dismissing public
law concerns, presidential scholars limit the study of the presidency. For example, John
Hart has noted the Neustadt’s approach “does not allow political science to distinguish
between the use and the abuse of Presidential power” (1977, 56). Hart proceeded to note
that the 1970s forced presidential scholars to address the power issue more fully.
He argued that the “power outcome, as opposed to the policy outcome, must then be
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considered and, if that outcome shows that power is being abused, can political scientists
avoid making statements about it?” Finally, Hart pointed out that it is ironic that “the
Neustadt framework might also be used to rate Nixon’s handling of the Watergate
cover-up as an effective example of Presidential power” (1977, 56).
It is often reported that Neustadt’s Presidential Power was not only a response to an
overly legalistic view of the presidency but also the inability of Corwin and others to
study “presidents’ capabilities to govern through means not formally prescribed”
(Whitford and Yates 2009, 3). That understanding of Corwin’s scholarship is false. First,
although Corwin certainly analyzed the presidency by way of a public law analysis, he did
so in broad and sweeping ways to give the president more constitutional and legal
authority than what even many contemporary presidency scholars would contend is
proper. For example, Corwin’s views on executive privilege are more expansive than what
many modern day judicial decisions permit (1957, 110-17). In another case, Corwin
(1932) advanced the idea that the Constitution is flexible enough to permit a more active
federal government. Various studies have been written that highlight Corwin’s impulse
to interpret the Constitution in ways that maximized presidential power (Tatalovich and
Schier 2014, 131-35; Tatalovich, Cook, and Yenor 2000, 105).
Second, Corwin’s work—in particular his presidency book—examined in great
detail the personal aspects of presidential power that Neustadt believes are so vital. As
mentioned, Corwin analyzed the president’s executive privilege authority—an aspect of
the presidency that is not mentioned in the Constitution. In addition, he reviewed other
features of the presidency that have been built through practice or, more aptly described,
the personality of the officeholder. These are the cabinet, removal power, and the presi-
dent as a legislative leader. One study found a number of “personalized leadership
practices” Corwin described and analyzed, including “the ‘bully pulpit,’ executive drafts-
manship of bills for Congress, delivery in person of the State of the Union Address, the
forging of interest groups coalitions, and the use of well-timed veto threats” (Tatalovich,
Cook, and Yenor 2000, 105). Corwin himself wrote, “what the presidency is at any
particular moment depends in important measure on who is President” (1957, 30). Far
from being some narrow “legalistic” view of the chief executive Corwin’s work studied
the presidency in practice in a much greater and richer detail than Neustadt’s more
narrow personalized account of presidential power.
Neustadt’s decision to divorce the Constitution from the study of the chief execu-
tive was not unique in the field of presidential studies (Fisher 2012, 2014). Indeed, his
thesis was compatible with the behavioralism bent of the political science profession and
the general faith that presidential scholars put into the presidency, particularly from
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) to John F. Kennedy (JFK). The implications, however,
for adopting the Neustadt model are clear. Presidential studies research began a rapid
movement away from the study of public law and with it any attention to whether the
presidency was adhering to the rule of law, due process standards, and other “legalistic”
concepts. Within political science, there were few scholarly predictions or warnings of the
downfall of the presidency through aggrandizement in the form of Richard Nixon. In
fact, one of the few individuals to warn of the accumulation of presidential power was
George Reedy (1970), former press secretary for Lyndon Johnson.
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The Decline of Public Law Analysis in Presidential Studies
The decline of legal analysis within political science is well known. Starting in the
early twentieth century, behavioralists looked to displace what they considered to be the
outmoded study of the law with more scientific methods. To be sure, at the founding of
APSA, public law was considered a key element in the study of political science. Giving
the inaugural presidential address at the first annual APSA conference Frank Goodnow
declared, “public law must be assigned a most important place in an association devoted
to the study of Political Science.” He proceeded to argue that “it is very doubtful whether
one can be a political scientist in any sense without a knowledge of the law governing the
systems subject to study” (Goodnow 1904, 42).
Less than ten years after Goodnow’s remarks, Woodrow Wilson (1911) openly
attacked the study of the law and provided a series of arguments for why political
scientists should disregard it altogether. In his presidential address at the seventh annual
APSA conference, Wilson argued that political science “must look away from the piece-
meal law books, the miscellaneous and disconnected statutes and legal maxims, the court
decisions, to the life of men” (1911, 6). He believed that law “in a moving, vital society
grows old, obsolete, impossible, item by item” (Wilson 1911, 1). Instead, Wilson
advanced a behavioral conception of political science divorced from public law: “I take
the science of politics to be the accurate and detailed observation of these processes by
which the lessons of experience are brought into the field of consciousness” (1911, 2).
Repeatedly he declared that political science should “break with our [legal] formulas”
because studying human behavior “through the medium of the constitutions and tradi-
tions of the states they live in” is foolhardy (Wilson 1911, 10).
Wilson’s dismissal of the public law concerns matches up well with our under-
standing of the man. He was a political reformer who advanced the idea that a great
statesman sitting in the White House could provide answers to the country’s problems.
His APSA convention speech was a continuation of his work in Constitutional Government
in the United States, which advanced similar notions that human actions and law are one
and the same: “constitutional government is one whose powers have been adapted to the
interests of its people” (Wilson 1908, 2). Wilson spoke of liberty and rights, but his
primary objective was to remove any constitutional and legal restrictions to government
action. He placed the need for an active government run by an unfettered chief executive
above all other considerations, including the rule of law and due process rights. Let the
president “once win the admiration and confidence of the country,” Wilson declared, “and
not one single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower
him” (1908, 68).
ToWilson, if constitutions and laws have no fixed meanings and are just byproducts
of human affairs, then there is no reason for political scientists to study them. Wilson
would not be the last APSA president to advocate the end of public law analysis. At the
1926 meeting, Charles Beard stated that the “creative work” in political science is
limited by several factors. First, among them is the discipline’s adherence to public law
concerns. He argued: “political science has too long been a house-hold drudge for
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lawyers—political lawyers at that.” Beard contented that the discipline primarily con-
cerns itself with “statutes, ordinances, decrees, and judicial decisions” which are “often
shadowy reflections of the stern realities of life” (1927, 6).
Beard’s criticisms matched well with the general behavioral mood beginning to
sweep the profession. In 1927, Floyd Allport argued that once the discipline realizes
“government itself is behavior,” it then becomes “possible for political scientists to cease
considering their field as one of formal description and legalistic philosophy, and to
regard it as a natural science” (1927, 277, italics in original). Another APSA president,
William Munro, did well to combine behavioralism’s impulse to dismiss public law
concerns with its desire to mimic the natural sciences: “Political science, to become a
science, should first of all obtain a decree of divorce from the philosophers, the lawyers,
and the psychologists with whom it has long been in the status of a polygamous
companionate marriage to the detriment of its own quest of truth” (1928, 8).
By the late 1930s, the de-emphasis of public law analysis had begun to be felt.
Speaking at the 1939 APSA convention, Charles Grove Haines discussed the decline of
public law “instruction in departments of political science” and the shifting of such
concerns to “law school curricula” (Haines 1940, 27). He noted that some in political
science “maintain that the only deserving place for public law courses in which the case
method of instruction is used is in the law schools.” Defending the place of public law in
political science Haines countered, “such views are incompatible with the best interests
of legal instruction both in the law schools and in departments of political science.”
Public law studies, he believed, belongs “as much to the field of the political and social
sciences as it does to the field of the law, and political and social scientists as well as
lawyers may well cooperate in the consideration and evaluation of the vital problems
involved in its development” (Haines 1940, 27).
A larger number of political scientists seemed to have listened toWilson and Beard,
not Goodnow and Haines. By the 1950s, Foster Sherwood could write that public law has
“all but disappeared as a recognized object of study for political science” (1958, 87). In
1968, C. Herman Pritchett wrote perhaps the most detailed and cited account of the
movement away from public law analysis by highlighting discipline surveys and studies.
In one survey, public law ranked next to last in the level of perceived importance to the
study of political science. In a series of cited studies, Pritchett described the rapid decline
since the 1950s in public law articles appearing in political science journals (1968, 480).
By 1967, Pritchett noted, APSA stopped listing public law in its convention program
and replaced the term with “Judicial Processes” (Pritchett 1968, 481).
Pritchett proceeded to list the various types of research pursuits within political
science. His accounting made clear that behavioral scholarship dominated the field of
public law by the late 1960s. In fact, another contemporary of Pritchett’s, Glendon
Schubert, claimed in 1963, “It is no exaggeration to state that the past half dozen years
have witnessed a transition from the study of public law to the study of judicial
behavior” (445). Such a picture matches up well with more contemporary studies of the
field. As Keith Whittington noted in 2000, “judicial decision making has been at
the core” of what most scholars view public law to be since the behavioral revolution
(601).
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The public law field is now officially titled, “Law and Courts”—a formal section
within the APSA organized in 1983. Even as far back as 1970, public law scholar
Theodore Becker advised, “we must drop the label ‘public law’ immediately.” Continu-
ing, he argued that public law “has absolutely no relationship to the development of any
theory whatsoever” (145). Writing five years later, Schubert provided a similar critique:
public law scholars “are uninterested in either systematic theory, quantitative methods of
research, statistical measurement of data, or observations of courts and judges—pursuits
that would make it possible to study adjudication in the context of the larger political
process” (1975, 37). Another scholar noted the public law label implied the field oriented
itself “toward law rather than political science” (Baum 1983, 198). As a result, even
within the field of public law, there is no consensus that legal analysis is a valid or useful
pursuit in the fulfillment of political science studies.
Second, the substance of the work within Law and Courts—as noted—is now
predominately focused on the study of judicial behavior. In a historical study of the field
Nancy Maveety discussed the “law avoidance” of contemporary political science and put
some of the blame on judicial behavioralism scholars because they “encouraged (though
not explicitly or directedly) in its ‘denigration [of] formal legal and constitutional
structures and languages as mere appearances behind which real and quantifiable
political behavior lurked.’”1 Continuing, she explained, “Constitutional law—doctrinal
analysis—remained an eroded remnant of public law and an undertaking that tied the
judicial field to its antediluvian roots: legalistic case analysis and legal structural descrip-
tion. Many judicial behavioralists—aspiring, perhaps, to be like their compatriots in
other fields—were ready to jettison such trapping of ‘fake lawyers’ servicing traditional,
marginal concerns of political science” (Maveety 2003, 18). The result of those changes
has meant that the term “public law” often takes on different meanings depending on the
scholar.
It is not surprising that with the general move away from the law in political
science and the public law field’s shift to the study of judicial behavioralism, fewer and
fewer presidency scholars employ traditional public law modes of analysis. However, that
does not mean public law analysis has gone missing in presidential studies. After Nixon’s
resignation and near impeachment, Thomas Cronin wrote The State of the Presidency
(1975), which provided a greater emphasis on public law analysis to the presidency.
Other works began to appear, including Richard Pious’s The American Presidency (1979);
Joseph Bessette and Jeffrey Tulis’s edited volume titled The Presidency in the Constitutional
Order (1981); Christopher Pyle and Richard Pious’s The President, Congress, and the
Constitution (1984); and Robert Spitzer’s The Presidential Veto (1988). In his recent article,
Louis Fisher provides a rather thorough listing of contemporary scholars who “place
executive power within the framework of the Constitution, law, and checks and balances”
(Fisher 2014, 167).
Despite the increase in public law analysis, presidential scholarship is still very
much orientated to the Neustadtian model (Howell 2003, 11). One recent study of
1. Maveety might have underestimated how explicit judicial behavioral scholars’ statements were
about jettisoning public law scholarship (see Schubert 1975, pt. I).
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Neustadt and presidential research by Matthew Dickinson quoted Presidential Power:
“Expertise in presidential power seems to be the province not of politicians as a class but
of extraordinary politicians. What sets such men apart?” That question—Dickinson
noted—is still waiting an answer (2009, 763). Perhaps after all the presidential blunders
since at least the publication of Neustadt’s book, presidential scholars should flip the
question: how do we limit presidential power when “extraordinary politicians” may not,
or even may, be serving in theWhite House? All humans, even the great ones, are fallible.
One must design and operate systems to mitigate against not only presidential mistakes
but abuses and illegalities as well. Instead of carefully analyzing presidential power, many
political scientists promote idealized models (Fisher 2012).
The work of William Howell reflects Neustadt’s emphasis on presidential energy,
action, and decisiveness. In today’s politics, he writes, “presidents can ill afford to
repudiate any power that might enable them to address the onslaught of expectations put
before them. For when they do, . . . they suffer mightily for it” (2013, 98). In practice,
according to Howell, “the public esteems presidents who break constitutional rules and
find ways to exercise their will in the face of institutional checks on their power” (2013,
106).
My point is not to dismiss Neustadt’s question regarding factors that make great
presidents. Instead, I contend that there should be a place in presidency scholarship for
theory-building and for works that place greater emphasis on describing and explaining
the complexity of politics by interweaving history and public law. This is not a new
prescription. Over 25 years ago, Michael Nelson argued that presidential scholars must
consider “constitutional, historical, cultural, and less tangible” measures that influence
presidential behavior (1987, xvi). In 2008, Richard Pious selected a book title that
would have been inconceivable to Neustadt: “Why Presidents Fail.” Behavioralists and
nonbehavioralists both have the same goal: explanation of political actions and events.
Too often the two sides go to war over the means to that end. A more constructive path
forward is to see value in both lines of inquiry.
Normative Scholarship: The “Is” Versus the “Ought-To-Be”2
One of the most significant changes to take place within political science during the
behavioral revolution has been the elevation of “neutral” work above all other research
pursuits. Writing in the late 1920s, Edward Corwin noted that behavioralist scholars
were trying “to convert political science from a ‘normative’ or ‘telic’ science, as it has been
variously called, into a natural science” (1929, 569). By the 1960s, the movement away
from “normative” scholarship was well entrenched. Behavioral scholars were routinely
announcing that the correct study of politics occurred when one studied “what is, not
with what ought to be” (Dahl 1961, 770). In 1975, Glendon Schubert wrote dismissively
of public law scholars: “the focus of inquiry in their writing—because it is not research
in any rigorous or scientific sense—consists of generalizations about verbal statements in
2. The subtitle is borrowed from a header in Edward Corwin’s 1929 article (586).
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normative form: i.e., law” (1975, 37). The insistence that political science should no
longer be preoccupied with normative concerns was the natural result of the
behavioralists’ focus on science and methods (Hyneman 1959, 178). Stephen Leonard
explains the shift: “if good scholarship was good science and good science was defined by
right method, then objectivity no longer required any particular political commitment.
Indeed, where scientific objectivity was once understood as necessarily entailing political
commitment—as it had for the founding fathers of the discipline—it now became a
matter of political neutrality” (1995, 84).
No doubt Neustadt ushered into the field of presidential studies one of the more
influential works with Presidential Power. That being said, it has a number of shortcom-
ings including a flaw inherent in Neustadt’s own model: presidents need to be power
maximizers. But why? Is power an institutional good unto itself? The very idea that
power is a good carries with it normative assumptions. Other presidential scholars have
shown that a president who looks to maximize power is likely to fail more often than he
succeeds (Arnold 1986, 361-62; Fisher 2013a; Hess 2002, 178; Pious 2008). If their
work is correct, then the power maximizer model needs to be reassessed. Or, in another
light, if one recognizes that presidents can abuse power, then the Neustadt model begins
to collapse.
After Presidential Power had been in print for nearly three decades, Neustadt had an
opportunity to reflect and reassess his model concerning presidential behavior. With his
1990 update Neustadt appeared to remain steadfast in his assertions about presidential
power: “I persist in the belief expressed in earlier editions of this book—namely that
pursuit of presidential power, rightly understood, constitutionally conditioned, looking
ahead, serves purposes far broader than a President’s satisfaction” (xix). At the center of
his remarks was a continued belief in presidential power. However, unlike his initial
writings, in 1960 Neustadt did more to qualify the use of presidential power with words
such as “rightly understood” and “constitutionally conditioned.” The qualifications lend
themselves to even more questions. Who gets to decide what is “rightly understood”?
What sort of “constitutionally conditioned” presidency did Neustadt have in mind? Such
questions are inherently normative.
After summarizing some of the failings of the presidency under JFK, Nixon, and
Ronald Reagan, Neustadt opined that those presidents “did not think enough about
prospective power, not anyway in its symbolic and constitutional dimensions” (1990,
xviii). If modern presidents “did not think” of their “constitutional dimensions,” cer-
tainly the lack of emphasis in Neustadt’s and others’ scholarship did not help them do so.
At no point in the 1960 edition of Presidential Power did Neustadt attempt to provide any
understanding of the limits—constitutional or otherwise—of the modern chief executive
for citizens or future White House officeholders. Perhaps doing so would have meant
moving in the direction of normative scholarship. If so, then Neustadt had already done
that by implicitly basing his model on normative assumptions (Eastland 1992, 298-99).
Regardless of why Presidential Power ignored public law concerns, Neustadt did not
write a book that realistically portrayed the presidency at the mid–twentieth-century
mark. What he wrote instead was a Gedenkschrift, or tribute, to FDR (Hargrove 2001,
245). Normative values of limitless power separated from the rule of law were imbedded
768 | PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2014
in Neustadt’s very model of the presidency. It fit well with the progressive view of the
presidency advocated by Woodrow Wilson (1908). In a certain sense, Neustadt’s vision
of the presidency was partly fulfilled by the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon. But the
Vietnam War blackened Johnson’s record, and the Watergate scandal under Nixon could
not have been what Neustadt envisioned for presidential leadership.
The lesson of Neustadt is not that normative research should somehow be com-
pletely removed from the study of the presidency. Far from it. There should always be in
the presidential studies field a variety of methodological approaches and views. My
contention is that in most discussions and studies of the presidency, it is necessary to
provide a mode of discussion and analysis that is forthcoming about the normative
assertions in one’s work (Snyder 2003, 353). In the field of presidential studies, nowhere
is this truer than when it comes to public law concerns. Public law scholarship by Corwin
and others should not be so easily dismissed or ignored by contemporary scholars. The
tradition of public law in political science is important because it helped determine when
presidential actions were constitutionally or legally justified.
Public law research is not a makeweight exercise. Dismissing normative questions
of law means ignoring an important part of presidential behavior: presidents and their
staff have strong incentives to understand and follow the Constitution and law. That was
a major weakness in Presidential Power. As Michael Nelson notes, “Neustadt ignored a
wide and important array of constitutional influences on presidential power, whether as
‘rules of the game’ that shape and sanction political behavior or as norms that presidents
and others follow, or at least invoke, in determining their actions” (1987, xvi). The
Constitution and laws not only give shape and authority to the federal government
but—more importantly—other institutional actors (i.e., federal judges and members of
Congress) and private citizens will often push back against presidents who break consti-
tutional and legal prohibitions. The fact is that various clauses of the Constitution order
and constrain behavior, and therefore any study of the presidency that simply ignores
them is deficient.
There are at least two important points that need to be raised in regard to norms
and public law. First, the assumption that public law concerns are always unclear is false.
The Constitution and law provides many instances where institutional actors are clearly
prohibited from acting. The speaker of the House can no more exercise the pardon power
than the president can spend money without an appropriation from Congress. Frederick
Schauer confirmed this view of law separating what he termed “easy cases” from “close”
or “hard” ones. To him, there are “lots of” easy cases in constitutional law and “once free
from the . . . preoccupation with close cases . . . we begin to comprehend the enormous
quantity of instances in which the legal results are commonly considered obvious”
(Schauer 1985, 414). Second, dictates from the Constitution or statutes are not simply
normative claims to some abstract value from long dead actors or vanished societies. The
Constitution and laws are real and much-used documents that significantly affect politi-
cal institutions and actors. Political actors can, and do, rely on the text, case law, and
interpretative views of scholars to determine their obligations and duties before the
law. Political scientists do a real disservice to the study of politics in ignoring such
concerns.
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History and practice guide constitutional government. Life needs to be breathed
into the Constitution to give it meaning beyond words that may have subjective or
uncertain implications. The research pursuits of historical institutionalism and consti-
tutional construction scholars are prime examples of such public law analysis. In Consti-
tutional Construction, KeithWhittington argues that presidents and lawmakers can and do
provide meaning to the Constitution. The Constitution depends on political actors to
“formulate authoritative constitutional requirements and to enforce those fundamental
settlements in the future” (Whittington 1999, 1). Of course, Whittington’s conceptual
formulation is not new. Other scholars have focused on the ability of Congress and the
president to provide their own interpretation and meaning of the Constitution (Fisher
1988; Morgan 1966).
Public law analysis has always been about more than a textual understanding of the
Constitution and laws. Since the early twentieth century legal scholars have researched
and debated the impact of law on political institutions. The works of Karl Llewellyn and
other legal realists distinguish between “paper rules” and “working rules” (Llewellyn
1930, 444-57). Such studies align well with behavioralist scholarship. Indeed, one critic
of the legal positivism school noted that legal realism “insists on drawing a sharp
distinction between the law that is and the law that ought to be” (Fuller 1940, 8). Such
pursuits have been and remain useful in the study of political science through a public
law analysis. Louis Fisher’s work in the area of presidential war power is a prime example.
Fisher notes that beginning with the Truman administration, presidents have not always
followed the constitutional requirement that Congress authorize or declare wars (2013a).
Disengaging from research that attempts to study and understand governing behavior
that either dismisses or adheres to binding constitutional and legal standards is not only
puzzling but misguided.
Law sets the stage for political actions to occur because it provides elected officials
the authority to act. It also prohibits certain actions. Besides making a public law analysis
of political behavior, scholars have a responsibility to offer judgments. As Cornell Clayton
once remarked about claims to neutrality, “honest research should lead on to whatever
conclusion the evidence recommends” (Fisher 2011, 300). That is why it is important for
political scientists to voice their judgment when they find fault with the actions of
presidents. A few of the more recent normative works that are driven by a public law
analysis include Richard Pious’s The War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law (2006), Louis
Fisher’s The Constitution and 9/11 (2008), and Michael Genovese’s A Presidential Nation
(2013). One of the most significant books in this vein is James P. Pfiffner’s Power Play
(2009), which took head on GeorgeW. Bush’s administration actions to expand the scope
of presidential power in ways that avoided and violated constitutional restrictions.
Conclusions
This article began by focusing on the struggles within political science between the
behavioral and nonbehavioral camps. Gabriel Almond believes that the two camps do not
represent the views of the average political scientist but instead they consist of the
770 | PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2014
extremists (1988, 830). The methodological debates have left at least one scholar to say
that “American-type political science is going nowhere” (Sartori 2004, 786). I think that
reaches too far. In the field of presidential studies, political scientists have (and do) offered
new and interesting insights that provide knowledge to the discipline and outside world.
However, there is a tendency among some scholars to internalize debates about political
research and focus on ever-narrower questions to the point where they fail to engage the
outside world in meaningful ways.
I believe Rogers Smith rightly diagnosed a major challenge that political science
faces, which is the profession “has always been shaped by two often conflicting desires:
to serve American democracy and to be a true ‘science’” (1997, 253). The rise of
behavioralism, and the creation of models, produced real and sustained problems within
the discipline (Ricci 1984). Modeling, for instance, took the discipline further away from
analytical pieces that describe political problems and into a level of abstraction that leaves
students and political leaders unsatisfied (Dixon 1971, 24). Such a criticism, as one
scholar pointed out, is “a clear indictment of the highly abstract and jargon-laden
discourse that had come to pass as high-quality scholarship” (Leonard 1995, 90). The
result is that analytical disputes have created barriers in fulfilling the original goal of the
discipline.
The “jargon” criticism is an old one. In 1984, David Ricci noted that jargon in
political science has proliferated because behavioralist scholars claim that “an effective
science can exist only where the ambiguity of everyday terms is avoided by a technical
vocabulary which enables scientists to speak precisely and effectively about the complex
world of nature and society (224). More recently, Robert Putnam, in his presidential
address at the 2002 APSA convention, criticized political scientists for not phrasing “our
knowledge in accessible ways.” He argued that “if we are to engage in civic deliberation
with our fellow citizens, we need to learn to speak ordinary English” (Putnam 2003,
252). A few years later, Stephen Wasby penned an article making a similar point: “even
if we continue to engage in ‘normal science’—in order to satisfy our peers and obtain
tenure and promotion—we can make that normal science more useful for practitioners by
making it more accessible” (2006, 491).
Critics of political science point to the increased specialization within the profession
that exacerbates the lack of relevance to the outside world. Lawrence Mead once labeled
the defect as “scholasticism.” By this he meant “a tendency for research to become
overspecialized and ingrown” (Mead 2010, 453). One scholar called the phenomenon
“the fetishism of subfields” (Kaufman-Osborn 2006). Mead’s central point was that
political science’s desire to mimic the natural sciences “has come at the expense of
relevance to political problems and issues as non-academics perceive them” (2010, 453).
Criticism that political science research is not pertinent to practitioners has been
continually debated (Gerring and Yesnowitz 2006, 104; Smith 1997; Wahlke 1978, 19).
I agree that our discipline can do better if we write articles that are more accessible to
nonacademics. However, aside from avoiding overly technical jargon, we should do more
to engage the real world. Certainly, congressional, presidential, and judicial fellowships
have been a real benefit to political science. However, a one- or two-year stint in a
congressional office does not necessarily give a person a “real” insight into what Congress
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is doing. Perhaps political science might build a stronger link to the political institutions
it studies by seeing more of its members following the practitioner–scholar model.
Political scientists, like Leonard White (member on the Civil Service Commission),
Charles Merriam (member on the National Resources Planning Board), and Louis
Brownlow (chair of FDR’s Committee on Administrative Management), were all active
researchers. All were also engaged in significant ways in our governing institutions. A
recent article by Louis Fisher identifies numerous political scientists who fill the role of
practitioner (2013b).
Political scientists could also do a better job of publishing in sources readily
available to the public. Recall that the essays known as The Federalist by Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison originally appeared in newspapers. Andrew
Stark noted, “It may be time for [political scientists] to do with the New Republic and the
New York Review of Books what they are so justifiably proud of doing with the American
Political Science Review and other peer-reviewed journals” (2002, 579). Certainly political
scientists publish in non–peer-reviewed outlets. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage,
various political scientists pen short articles by applying their research to contemporary
political issues. However, Stark’s point is a good one. The discipline continues to
marginalize itself by failing to engage the outside world (Jacobs and Skocpol 2006, 28).
Publishing articles and book reviews in more widely circulated and read places is
certainly a small but important step at engagement. On a personal note, during my time
working at Congressional Research Service I knew staffers were more likely to pick
experts to testify who engaged both the public and Congress. Scholars in other
disciplines—most notably law professors—have been successful at such engagement
tactics. As a result, they have taken the place of political scientists as the go-to experts at
congressional hearings.3
Observations that political science has left public policy to other professions are
nothing new. In 1971, Robert Dixon wrote, “To the extent that political science mini-
mizes substantive public law and focuses on measurement and numerology, it leaves
substantive matters to the still pragmatically oriented law professors” (25). Political
scientists, by knowledge and training, are as capable as law professors in providing expert
advice to Congress, the president, and others. This is a matter the discipline should
greatly encourage. Some might argue that law professors, because of their legal training,
have an advantage in addressing public law concerns. However, since the early twentieth
century, legal realism has come to dominate. Many lawyers believe that law is shaped by
the personal values of those who interpret and apply it (i.e., judges and lawyers). In that
respect, law professors are no different than behavioralists. Both see law as what is
practiced (a behavioral conception) and not necessarily what is required by the Consti-
tution or statutes.
Consider the work by law professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule. In The
Executive Unbound (2010), they argue that the aggrandizement of executive power and
concerns about whether the Constitution has been violated should not matter because
3. C. Herman Pritchett was likely one of the first political scientists to make such an observation (see
Pritchett 1968, 483-84).
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presidential actions are safely constrained by politics and public opinion. Under such a
system of government, they argue, the Constitution and law cease to have any meaning.
Even on its face, the proposition is not true. Political actors cannot so readily dismiss the
rule of law and rely on public opinion to carry the day. Constitutional and legal
obligations can and do shape political behavior.
Robert Spitzer makes an important point about leaving the field of public law
analysis to law professors. Their legal training and primary publication outlets—law
reviews—tend to provide opportunities to invoke unreliable views of the Constitution
(Spitzer 2008). Spitzer directs the bulk of the blame to law reviews that are run by law
students. Such outlets publish non–peer-reviewed articles that are not subject to “any
expertise-based assessment.” As he notes, law reviews “are a breeding ground for wayward
constitutional theorizing” (Spitzer 2008, 4). In particular, Spitzer points to how the
history of the Commander-in-Chief Clause has been misconstrued through such publi-
cations (Spitzer 2008, 99-128). The point is that political scientists should not disengage
from such discussions. Without Spitzer’s and others’ work in the area of presidential
power, political science would likely only have legal arguments from law reviews that rely
on misleading constitutional history or theories.
Finally, constitutional and legal authority questions should be a valid and impor-
tant part of presidential studies. As Andrew Rudalevige recently noted, “we need to give
harder thought to when presidents—not the current president, whomever that president
is—should be powerful, and when they should be constrained. And we need to do so,
preferably, before the next crisis swamps critical thought” (2009, 24). Prospective or even
retrospective studies of public law concerns within political science journals are rare.
Looking at the articles that have appeared in the American Political Science Review (APSR),
American Journal of Political Science (AJPS), and Journal of Politics (JOP)—three general
political science journals that are routinely ranked at the top of Thomson Reuters’ Journal
Citation Reports—one sees a lack of attention placed on public law and normative
concerns.
None of the journals published an article from 2001 until early 2014 that provides
a public law analysis to the study of political science. The APSR did not publish an article
within the 2001-2014 period that even somewhat focused on the presidency and public
law. In AJPS two articles appeared with such a focus (Conrad and Moore 2010; Dragu and
Polborn 2014), and two were published in JOP (Dragu and Polborn 2013; Keith, Tate,
and Poe 2009). Three of the articles emphasized torture or human rights abuses (Conrad
and Moore 2010; Dragu and Polborn 2013; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009). The fourth
analyzed security policy and terrorism concerns (Dragu and Polborn 2014). Missing from
the political science literature during this time were topics that dealt with these consti-
tutional and legal issues: the creation of military tribunals, torturing of detainees, and the
use of drones against suspected terrorists. On the domestic side, missing from the
literature were the constitutionality of recess appointments during an intrasession break,
executive privilege claims to withhold information from Congress, and the use of per-
sonal immunity to shield federal officials from accountability.
APSR, AJPS, and JOP might not be a representative sample of what constitutes
political science research. As Lee Sigelman noted when reviewing the history of APSA,
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“I doubt that the contents of [APSR] constitute a representative cross-section of the
research that political scientists have produced as the discipline has evolved, or even of
their ‘best’ work” (2006, 463). However, these journals stand at the head of the class and
are generally considered to be the most valued publications for promotion and tenure. As
a result, the inability of even one article that employs public law analysis to appear in
these journals is troubling. Certainly public law articles have appeared in other journals
like Presidential Studies Quarterly and Political Science Quarterly but those works represent
only a small fraction of the political science scholarship. That is regrettable because
political science has real opportunities to address relevant and pressing political
questions.
This article does not advocate the primacy of public law research. Nor does it
contend that public law analysis supplies all the answers. Stephen Skowronek has rightly
argued that the meaning of the Constitution can be “eminently contestable and fiercely
contested” and that “a satisfactory resolution” to various legal controversies might be
“quite limited” (2011, 30). He is right: public law analysis is limited, but so are all other
research methods in political science. If political scientists were to follow only perfect
methods of analysis, then the profession would have none. Instead, public law analysis can
be viewed as a way to understand and further the study of politics by focusing on the
constitutional and legal aspects of governing behavior. In that light, public law analysis
is a useful tool for political scientists to employ and could be helpful in bringing greater
relevance to the political science profession.
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